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"Attitude research" has traditionally occupied a central place in
the study of human behavior, and an increasing amount of research effort
within the consumer research community is being directed in this area.
In introducing new research, it may be useful to develop a perspective
on the questions that may be asked about the attitude construct. As a
starting point for such a question-based framework, attitude research
may be dichotomized into two categories: attitude structure and attitude
dynamics. Studies of attitude structure are concerned with valid repre-
sentation of the cognitive elements which underlie an existing product
attitude. One important question which is asked is, "Upon what cognitive
cues is the judgment of a multidimensional product based?" Research
focusing on this question attempts to identify a set of cues and demon-
strate that the set satisfactorily predicts the summary evaluation
(attitude) of the product at a particular point in time. Recent con-
sumer research has focused on that set of elements proposed by the
expectancy-value notions of Fishbein (7) and Rosenberg (22); contro-
versy has arisen about the optimal set of these elements (variously
called "beliefs," "evaluative dimensions," "possessions," "affective
loadings," "perceived instrumentalities," or "value weightings")
and their operational measurement (e.g., 4
, 19, 24, 26). A second
question, closely related to identification cues is, "What is judgmental
law by which the elements identified are combined?" Given the isolation
of the inputs and the output, what psychometric function explains the
actual process used in a static situation? The models cited above
assume a linear compensatory processing rule. Other assumptions, such
as conjunctive or disjunctive rules, have been proposed and demonstrated
(5), but consumer researchers have not exhibited interest in this question
as of yet.
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It should be noted that the questions framed so far take the cues
used by the individual as given; the research is cross-sectional and
is not concerned with variations in the structural components or in the
attitude associated with the product over time. Research in attitude
dynamics centers on this process of modification of existing attitudinal
cues from time t to time t+1. In this context, somewhat similar questions
may be asked: "What are the cues which serve as intervening mediators
of attitude change? In what way do these cues interact within the
process of change? What environmental factors influence the answers to
the first two questions?" While applied researchers have begun to demon-
strate interest in cognitive models of attitude structure, no comparable
interest has been expressed in the cognitive processes relating to
attitude dynamics. The research that has appeard has investigated the
effect of a situational variable or an individual variable (or occasional-
ly both in interaction) on an index of the summary outcome, but little
empirical attention has been directed at representation or explanation
of the processes mediating change. To a certain degree, this is at-
tributable to an insistence (among both basic and applied researchers)
in relying on traditional "black-box" methodologies in dynamics research,
and a reluctance to explore the design requirements necessary to direct
"process-monitoring" measurement. A systematic review of the criterion
variables used in attitude change designs show that non-involving,
information-poor scale responses have been dominant.
A "Cognitive-Response" Perspective
Hierarchical models describing the process of attitude dynamics
have been offered at the conceptual level by a number of observers.
Systematic elaboration of the models intuitively proposed has not been

prevalent. The idea that attitude modification involves a sequential,
multi-stage process is common to all models, although the number of
stages delineated by various proponents of such hierarchical models
differs. An example of such a model is McGuire's (16) "information-
processing" model in which each stage is linked probabilistically to
the preceding stage. The initial stages in the process are "attention"
to new information and "comprehension" of this information. The third
stage in the model is "yielding" to what is received. Attitude modi-
fication occurs after this stage. Although the model includes two
additional stages which complete the linkage between attitude modifi-
cation and overt behavior, only the initial mediators are relevant
here.
The inclusion of mediating stages related to both a reception
process and a yielding process is common to models of communication.
Of interest is the tendency to place a preponderance of the explanatory
burden on the reception mediator. This single-minded attention to the
reception or learning process is evident in McGuire's description of
the dynamics of the information processing model: "Use of the infor-
mation-processing approach involves predicting how an independent
variable will be related to attitude change by analysis of the variable's
likely effect on learning the contents of the social influence communica-
tion. The guiding idea here is that the essential problem in a social
influence situation is adequate reception of the message (16)." This
orientation suggests, therefore, that cues contained within the incoming
information areof primary importance in mediating attitude change. A
direct relationship between comprehension of message content and attitude
change has been difficult to demonstrate, however; various studies have

produced no evidence of a relationship, or evidence of significant posi-
tive or negative (or both) relationships.
However, if the receiver is viewed as an active information-processor,
he can be expected to attempt to relate the incoming information to his
existing structure of beliefs, feelings, or values. The interaction of
communication content as transmitted with the recipient's cognitive structur
will generate additional cues. These relational activities thus represent
the source of another major class of cues, the spontaneous cognitive
responses . An evolving body of empirical evidence suggests that these
spontaneous responses (what we usually refer to as critical thought) are
the primary mediators of attitude modification (8) although relevant
research in the applied area of advertising is virtually non-existent.
However, representation and direct empirical investigation of the cues
used in the reception and yielding process has not progressed much bey-
ond the broad classifications suggested by the hierarchical models.
This study was therefore concerned with modeling the yielding stage
of the persuasion process in terms of an array of spontaneous cognitive
responses to an advertising stimulus. An integral first step entailed
the theoretical identification of cognitive response variables relevant
to marketing communications. Directly related, and most challenging, was
the development of rigorously defined operational measures for these
variables together with an experimental methodology for elicitation of
the required direct subject protocols.

Identification of the Cues
Counterargument
While direct investigation of the spontaneous processes antecedent
to attitude change has been scarce, certain types of cognitive responses
have been the focus of conjecture at the conceptual level. Subvocal
"counterargument" has been proposed as a possible mediator of communica-
tion acceptance by various psychologists.
A counterargument is triggered when incoming information is compared
to the existing belief structure and a discrepancy is noted. A counter-
argument represents a spontaneous subvocal belief statement, related
psychologically to the message topic, which neutralizes or counters
message evidence. Festinger and Maccoby (6) accorded counterargument
a major role in explaining their finding of an absolute increase in
attitude change under conditions in which audience members were partially
distracted from the speaker's message. Distraction, according to Festinger
and Maccoby, interferes with the individual's ability to counterargue,
thus eliminating one important means by which he resists yielding to message
arguments. (As an example of the general failure to attempt direct inquiry
into the processes mediating persuasion, only two of the more than thirty
subsequent studies of distraction effects in the marketing and psychological
literature treated counterargument as a dependent variable.)
Earlier references may be found which point to essentially the same
type of cognitive reaction (10, 12). McGuire (15) used counterargument
as an independent variable in a program of research concerned with making
attitudes resistant to change. Scattered studies have examined the effects
of variables such as level of threat (11) or message discrepancy (2) on
anticipatory or concurrent counterargument. Counterarguments are therefore
one potentially important mediator of attitudinal acceptance of advertising
messages.
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Source Derogation
An alternate type of resistive response focuses on the source of
the persuasive message content. Source derogation has been traditionally
viewed as a viable mode of resolution which may serve as a substitute
for cognitive reorganization when discrepant information is confronted.
This type of response may be used quite frequently in situations where
the source of the message is easily discounted as biased (an unfortunate
description of mass-media advertising) or where counterargument is
difficult (1). Source derogations may be expected to serve as cues
which contribute toward rejection of arguments only in the immediate
encounter; their effect on immediate attitudinal acceptance may be as
devastating as the effect of counterarguments, but the durability of
this effect over time is open to question. In terms of the cues
entering the model, we might therefore expect that counterarguments are
generated and retained as an operating factor within the structure re-
lated to a product, whereas source derogations are generated but sub-
sequently disassociated from the structure.
Support Argument
If counterargument represents one interesting cue, it is reasonable
to assume that support-argument may be equally important. In relating
incoming information to his existing belief structure, a receiver may
activate responses which indicate that congruent associations have been
discovered, that the arguments in the message agree with or are supported
by some belief which already exists. Generation of this type of cue
would appear vital if advertising is to have a positive influence.

Strangely, support-argument has received substantially less consideration
than counterargument in attitude change theories; examination of spontaneous
support-argument has likewise been relatively ignored empirically. In
modeling cognitive response processes, there is, however, a compelling
logic to giving support -argument formal representation. Examining the
relationship of spontaneous support-argument to attitude modification
may also provide a basis for a clearer conceptualization of the true
role of learning.
Integration of the Cues
One of the most interesting problems in attitude dynamics is
attempting to understand how individuals integrate the separate cog-
nitive response cues in reorganizing their attitude when faced with
persuasive messages. Virtually all theories of attitude change, im-
pression formation and human judgment have in common the idea that indi-
viduals utilize cognitive elements in combination with each other. With-
out question, the idea of additive linear integration dominates the
literature of each of the above areas. All of the linear compensatory
proposals derive from a general limear model of the form:
A = ^ "k ^k
where A is the attitude, impression, or judgment
s is the scale value of an individual element
w is the weight attached to that element
Several models based on this integrative hypothesis were developed and
tested in this study. As Rosenberg (23) points out, the number of
assumptions permissable within this general model is quite large.
Rather than attempt to be exhaustive at such an early stage in this
type of research, only assumptions which appeared theoretically justifi-
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able a priori were examined.
One model, the "counterargument model" makes the assumption that
counterarguments, in and of themselves, are the primary mediators of
attitude modification. This is equivalent to assuming that only negative
belief-cognitions directed toward the topic of the advertising message
need be considered in explaining attitudinal acceptance of the message.
Such an assumption appears viable given the heavy relative emphasis
placed on this particular type of cue in divergent attitude-change
theories. Although processing of uni-directional elements only is not
a standard assumption in judgmental or impression-formation models, the
nature of the variables and of the process under examination here are
quite different.
The more common assumption of a compensatory integration across
more than a single subset of cues is also quite reasonable on a priori
basis. For example, it is reasonable to expect that support- and counter-
arguments are both considered, with one balancing the other, when a
person processes the communication. This broadens the set of cues
entering the model to include support arguments. Carrying this
elaboration to its logical end, the model can also be broadened to
accommodate source derogations.
The concept of a weight in the linear model incorporates the idea
that individuals assign different levels of importance to some of the
available cues. It may be that certain responses would be recognized
as more important as they are elicited, and that these responses then
contribute disproportionately as mediators of attitude modification.
As is typical with weighted models, the weights (importance ratings)
assigned each element were not theoretically predictable but are
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empirically-based parameters which rely on information in the data
itself.
Unweighted (wj^=l for all ^) and weighted (w, =subjective importance
ratings for each j^) integrative processing models were proposed as alternatives
to the "counterargument model." The relationship of these unweighted and
weighted integrational models of cognitive response processes to the familiar
Pishbein model of attitude structure should be noted. Beliefs are the
integral cognitive element of both the Fishbein formulation and the spon-
taneous counterargument, support argument, and source derogation concepts.
The Fishbein model uses a standardized set of existing beliefs to predict
existing attitude. The unweighted integrative model proposed here is the
sum of positive and negative beliefs spontaneously activated in response
to a persuasive advertisement. The weighted integrative model is the
sum of spontaneously activated beliefs with each belief weighted by its
subjective importance. In contrast to the Fishbein model, the belief-
cues entering the cognitive-response model are not limited to product-
specific beliefs; beliefs about related concepts or objects are also
allowed to enter. The only criteria is that the spontaneous responses
are perceived by the receiver as linked in some way to the product
attitude structure or to the new information. Thus, the representation
and processing axioms suggested for explanation of dynamics are con-
ceptually compatible with a well-validated structural model; the diver-
gences of range and type of admissable cue are necessitated by differences
in the behaviors in question.
Situational Factors
The third question of interst concerns the identification of
environmental factors (other than the message cues) which will have an
effect on (a) the type of cognitive-response cues elicited, and (b) the
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usage of the cues as mediators of attitudinal acceptance. Environmental
factors may operate either through an arousal influence on a person's
cognitive response behavior, or through an influence on the capacity
of the person to engage in critical information processing. Two variables,
prominent in structuring the environment of mass-media advertising, were
singled out for study.
Decision Involvement
Potential consumers are exposed to mass media advertisements in an
environment cluttered with other stimuli. In most cases, their initial
involvement will be directed toward the editorial matter of the media
(programming and articles) rather than the commercial messages. The
individual's motivation to cognitively respond to the advertisement is
not great. However, when a person is confronted with an advertisement
which he perceives as particularly relevant to an impending decision,
he can be expected to engage his cognitive facilities in critical proces-
sing of the message.
These two situations, representing variations in acute involvement
with the advertising information, are thus of interest as they result
in contrasting processes of cue utilization. It is important to distin-
guish this dimension of involvement from "issue Involvement." "Issue
involvement" refers to an individual's concern with a given topic
because it is intrinsically involving to that person, presumably due to
a close linkage with the person's basic needs or ego. Issue involvement
is chronic and is product-specif ic . [For representative research, see
(24)]. Decision involvement, conversely, is situational and is
related to the perceived relationship of a particular task (e.g., critical
information processing) to a particular problem solution (e.g., an im-
pending decision). It is closely related to Zimbardo's (30) description
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of "taks" involvement: "the individual's concern with the consequences
of his response or with the instrumental meaning of his opinion ( )."
Message Modality
Message modality is of interest because of a hypothesized influence
on the capacity of an individual to engage in critical cognitive response.
A review of the psychological and marketing literature revealed that
modality has received surprisingly little theoretical or empirical
attention with respect to models to attitude dynamics; empirical studies
have largely interchanged modalities without systematic control or con-
sideration. Theory in this area remains primarily intuitive.
Accordingly, a theoretical perspective was established by the author,
and its implications explored.
Audio communication is characterized by an uncontrollable rate of
cognitive stimulation; with print communication exposure rate is controlled
by the receiver. Mass media advertising imposes multiple cognitive tasks
on the receiver. Each of these tasks (intake of message content, intake
of ancillary situational information, and cognitive response to message
content) competes for a share of the individual's total cognitive capacity.
When exposure rate is uncontrollable, little opportunity exists to allo-
cate among the different cognitive activities by such behaviors as re-
reading a passage or pausing in the midst of stimulus scanning to develop
counterarguments
.
Individuals can be expected to attempt to handle the situational
demands arising from audio and print transmission as efficiently as possible
If we assume people are adaptive in their behavior, then quite different
information-handling strategies will have evolved from consumers' repeated
confrontations with audio or print media. The possibility of different
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strategies of cue utilization implies that different theoretical
models of attitude-change process would be necessary for different
physical modes. Given the extremely important decisions about channel
selection facing the advertising community and the formal ignorance of
modality in contemporary attitude-change theory, the effect of the mode
variable becomes an important question.
Elicitation and Coding of Spontaneous Protocols
Seeking answers to the research questions summarized earlier required
going beyond traditional input-output analysis and attempting to obtain
measures of the events occurring between input (information presentation)
and output (attitudinal acceptance). Elicitation and analysis of verbal
protocols was thus an important part of the design. Protocol elicitation
and coding techniques are much more primitively developed in attitude-
dynamics research than in problem-solving simulations. Only scattered
attempts at measuring spontaneous thought processes of subjects exposed
to communications have appeared in the social-psychological literature;
interest has picked up very recently, but no hard 'concensus existed upon
which to base the current methodology. Techniques have ranged from having
the subject concurrently verbalize his responses during exposure (11) to
simply asking for self-reports of time spent counterarguing (31), How-
ever, the most common method is the recording of thoughts on a free-
response measure immediately after message exposure. When this exercise
is administered unexpectedly and with tight timing controls, it represents
a valid means for measuring spontaneous processes.
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In developing a set of variables around which theoretical relation-
ships are to be specified, it is desirable that each variable be clearly
defined in terms of inclusions and exclusions. When the measurement
process involves coding of subject protocols reported in free-response,
the need for well-developed definitions is even more acute.
A critical review of operational measures of cognitive response used
in previous research is available elsewhere (29). An operational definition
of counterargument proposed by Osterhouse and Brock (21) served as a start-
ing point in this study, although important extensions and modifications
were made. Briefly, these include (a) adaptation to acknowledge that
marketing communications place emphasis on both an object (the product)
and an act (purchase, usage) and responses may therefore focus on either
characteristics of the product or its alternatives and consequences of
the act or alternative acts; (b) recognition of rhetorical questions as
a legitimate and frequently used form of counterargument expression;
(c) specific exclusion of purely affective cognitions from the definition
of counterargument or support argument; and (d) development of operational
definitions for support argument, source derogations, and curiosity
expressions. No previous design had attempted to rigorously define
these variables. The operational measures used in this study are
presented in Appendix A.
Measurement Validity
One potential problem which confronted the research design concerned
the degree to which cognitions recorded actually correspond to those spon-
taneously evoked during message exposure. The question is whether the
subject is listing thoughts which occur as a result of the researcher's
request rather than which occurred naturally in response to the adver-
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tising stimulus. Two methods were available for handling this problem
within the design. The first entails imposing a severe limit on the
time given the subjects to respond. While some previous designs had im=
posed ten-minute limits, that was felt to be much too lenient to insure
internal validity in this study. Consequently, extensive pretesting of
the measurement technique was undertaken using the actual experimental
message. The essential guideline is, of course, to allow a subject suf-
ficient time to completely record the honestly spontaneous cognitions
without allowing time for extraneous, reactive cognitions. The pretesting
established that a time limit of three minutes appeared optimal for
controlling this potential source of invalidity within the design.
It was noted that Krugman (13) advised using 'a somewhat different
method for controlling for spurious cognitions. The subject was asked,
after he verbally stated each thought in a post-exposure interview, to
reconsider whether the thought had been evoked during exposure or after
exposure. This procedure would appear to stretch out the protocol-
gathering process significantly, thus making conditions for generation
of reactive responses ideal. Another problem with this control procedure
was that the "during-af ter" dichotomy may be more rigid than should be
required by validity objectives. The researcher assumed that cognitive
response must follow perception of communication content by some increment
of time. Thus, it was felt that ideas occurring immediately after exposure
to new information should still legitimately be considered as "concurrent"
responses
,
One additional measurement question concerned the sequence in which
measures of the cognition listing and attitudinal criterion measures should
be elicited. While arguments questioning the effect of either sequence
on measurement validity may be presented, taking the spontaneous measure
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before the attitude expression represents the process as it naturally
occurs and probably results in less distortion of spontaneous responses
than the reverse order. Limited evidence suggests that measurement
sequence has no important effect on the nature or level of spontaneous
response (3)
.
Sub jects
Subjects for this study were 165 adult women drawn from the member-
ships of various church and social organizations in the central Penn-
sylvania area. The study was described in all contacts with group leaders
or members, as concerned with mass media communication and conducted
under the auspices of the Center for Research at the Pennsylvania State
University. There was no mention of advertising, ^marketing, or business
administration. Subjects ranged in age from 26- to 53. The women com-
prising this subject pool were very heterogeneous with respect to their
educational, occupational, and social class backgrounds. Compensation
for participation was made to the groups rather than to individuals.
Experimental Communications
The topic of the experimental advertisement was a product called
"Synthetic Meals," a line of food products made from soybeans and soy-
bean derivatives. This product, although technically hypothetical,
was selected after extensive pretesting had established that it met
certain criteria judged important in producing a fair and reasonable test
of the research hypotheses. Pretesting with similar subjects had shown
that the product was characterized by a pre-experimental range of
attitudinal positions across individual women, absence of a marked
negative or positive bias, a reasonable level of inherent interest,
and a moderate degree of newness. Regarding the product's newness, it
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was found that the product vjas not felt to be unexpected or discontinuously
innovative (somewhat similar products exist) . The product has added
interest as a research topic because it represents a potential solution
to an important social problem.
The experimental advertising message contained six arguments in favor
of adopting the product. Briefly, the arguments were: that the product
is comparable in taste to natural foods, that the product provides
nutritive balance which the typical family meal may lack, that preparation
of this product is more trustworthy than packing of natural foods, that
the product can aid in weight-control for children, that natural foods
may be polluted, and that the price of natural foods is rising. Reading
time for the Print version was approximately 1-2 minutes. Playing time
for the Audio version was 1 minute, 10 seconds. The Audio version was
taped by a professional radio announcer using the station's facilities.
The text of both Audio and Print versions was, of course, identical. In
order to simulate as far as possible the natural conditions in which
people encounter advertising messages, the experimental advertisement
was presented in the midst of surrounding "editorial" matter. This
consisted of an excerpt from a national magazine feature, logically
adaptable to both print and radio presentation . which preceded
the advertisement. This was done to enhance the impression, created
by the introduction, that the entire communication was an excerpt
taken at random from the mass media, and as a control for artificial
stimulation of response to the ad. The editorial passage evoked no
responses related to the product nor any overt emotional responses in
pretest interviews. TJie editorial matter was 182 words in length; the
advertising message was 192 words long.
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Procedure
Experimental sessions were conducted in assembly rooms in the home
city of the subject. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four ex-
perimental treatments as specified by the 2x2 crossed factorial
design. The subjects in a particular cell (final cell size of 40) were
processed in groups of five or less. Naive experimental assistants
monitored each session. All remarks made by the assistants were read
directly from a prepared script. Subjects were seated so as to preclude
chances for visual or verbal interaction.
The introduction described the study as concerned with people's
normal reaction to mass media communications. Subjects were told they
would be presented an excerpt from a national magazine or radio show
consisting of a regular feature story and an advertisement. Fore-
warning of the general nature of the communication was felt to be
desirable in that people typically are aware of the general nature of
what they will encounter in mass media exposures.
The decision involvement manipulation was accomplished by instruct-
ing subjects in the "High Decision Involvement" treatment that they could
expect to make a short-run decision about the product appearing in the
impending advertisement. The relevance of this decision in terms of
their families, their own time and effort, and their personal finances
were emphasized. Subjects in the "Low Decision Involvement" treatment
received no such instruction.
Subjects were asked to approach the entire communication in a
natural manner. They were told that there was "no particular need to
memorize." Pretest subjects had revealed that they found themselve^
trying to memorize the message content in a manner they felt to be
atypical of their natural reading or listening style. Because this
singular attention to rate-memorization might have interferred with the
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spontaneity of subjects' cognitive responses, it was deemed advisable
to dampen this unnatural memorization urge.
Subjects were then exposed to the experimental communication.
Immediately after communication exposure, subjects were given booklet B
which contained the Cognition Listing dependent measures. Subjects then
turned to Booklet C which contained the remainder of the dependent measures.
Subjects were informed there was no time limit for Booklet C. They were
asked to work straight through the booklet to the end. Order of presenta-
tion of the dependent measures in Booklet C was: attitudinal acceptance
measures, reception measures, cognition weighting, cognition' origin.
Completion of Booklet C took approximately 25 minutes. Running time for
the entire experiment was approximately 35-40 minutes.
Dependent Measures
Cognition Listing
The Cognition Listing measure was contained completely in Booklet
B. As discussed earlier, this task was unexpected as a control against
an artificial response set. ^Subjects were instructed to list any and
all thoughts relevant to the product Synthetic Meals or to the advertising
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message which had occurred to them during exposure or which occurred
to them now. They were instructed to ignore spelling, punctuation, and
grammer since cognition content, not cognition form, was of primary
interest. In order to facilitate coding, subjects were asked to use a
separate line for each separate thought. Directly beneath the instruc-
tions were 18 horizontal lines stretching the width of the paper about
% inch apart.
Attitudinal Acceptance
The first item used to measure attitudinal message acceptance con-
sisted of elicitating the response of the subject to the statement, "The
arguments about the Sjmthetic Meals product contained in the advertise-
ment were very convincing." The focus of this measure was on the product
dimensions covered in the communication ; it will be labeled A . Subjects
responded on a six-point scale with each point labeled as to degree of
agreement. Labels ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree."
The second measure of attitudinal acceptance consisted of subject
response to the question, "How do you yourself feel about the product
Synthetic Meals?" The focus was on overall attitude toward the product
(A ) . The response-scale consisted of 26 dots spaced 1/8 inch apart.
Endpoints of this scale line were labeled, "I like it very much" and "I
don't like it at all." Subjects circled the dot which best designated
their feeling on the question. In order to determine the effect of
the message on behavioral tendencies, a measure of buying intention
(BI) was used as a surrogate for actual purchase behavior. Subjects
responded to the question, "Will you purchase the Synthetic Meals
product when it becomes available in your local area?" Subjects
responded on a five-point scale with each point labeled. Labels ranged
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from "definitely will" to "definitely won't." This measure was taken
at the end of Booklet C; it therefore came approximately 20 minutes
after the first two measures.
Reception
Subjects were asked on an open-ended question to reproduce as many
of the arguments included in the advertising message as they could. This
measure was viewed as more integrally related to post-communication
attitude formation than the second measure. A second measure of reception
consisted of a number of multiple -choice questions about specific points
in the advertising message.
Measurement of Cognition Weights
Subjects were asked to rate each separate thought they had recorded
earlier on the Cognition Listing measure with respect to its importance
to them in forming an opinion about the Synthetic Meals product. This
rating was accomplished by having the subject place a number correspond-
ing to perceived level of importance beside each thought at the edge of
the Cognition Listing measure. A rating of "1" was assigned if the
thought was "extremely important;" a rating of "2" if the thought was
"moderately important;" a rating of "3" if the thought was "slightly
important."
Measurement of Perceived Cognition Origin
Subjects were asked to evaluate each separate thought recorded
earlier on the Cognition Listing measure according to its perceived
origin. If the subject felt that the thought had originated directly
in the advertising message, she labeled it with an A. If she felt the
thought had been a reaction by her to something stated directly in the
advertisement, she labeled it with a B. If the subject felt the thought
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was one that she had originated and was not a reaction to something
directly stated in the advertisement, she labeled it C,
Coding of Cognition-Listina Protocols
Three members of the edi tortal staff of the Journal of Marketing
served as protocol judges
-
The scoring convention adopted by this study was as follows: the
basis for final rating of each cognition was the modal rating of the
three judges. If 2 of the 3 judges agreed in rating a cognition, that
rating was assigned to the cognition. Unanimous agreement among the
judges were achieved on Ib.TL of the cognitions. Two of the three
judges agreed on 227o of the cognitions. Thus, the modal convention
resulted in assignment of a rating of 98.77o of the cases on the initial
attempt. Only 12 of the 913 cognitions drew initial disagreement among
all three judges. These 12 cognitions were presented to the sane panel
of judges for rejudging . Judges were not told what the ratings in the
first attempt had been. Ratings were achieved for all but two of the
cognitions on the second trial. Both of the unrated cognitions belonged
to the same subject's protocol: that subject's data was consequently
eliminated from the study.
An analysis of variance was performed on the first set of cognition
ratings to provide an estimate of the inter-judge reliability in assign-
ing category scores to a subject (28, pp. 124-128). A separate analysis
was conducted for three different cognitive-response categories of
importance to the study: cognitive counterarguments, cognitive support
arguments, and cognitive source derogations.
The inter- judge reliability in assigning subject's counterargument
scores was .957. The inter-judge reliability in assigning support
argument scores was .898. The inter- judge reliability in assigning
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source derogation scores was .959. These coefficients provide evidence
of high reliability in the coding of experimental protocols. Taking
this evidence together with that provided by the high percentage of
unanimous cognition ratings, the use of judges working within a frame-
work of rigorous theoretical category definitions was accepted as a
valid method for the extraction of cognitive response variables from
spontaneous, unstructured subject protocols.
Analysis
Several theoretically derived models were offered as descriptions
of the process of cognitive cue utilization in attitudinal acceptance
of persuasive advertising. In order to compare these models, regressions
were performed using each separate model as a predictor of the attitudinal
criterion measures. Separate analyses were performed within each of the
experimental treatments to provide insight into the conditional limita-
tions of proposed mediational models. These are presented in Table 1,
along with the overall within-class correlations.
The Counterargument Model
The counterargument model assumes that negative spontaneous beliefs
are the primary mediator of acceptance, and therefore that variance in
post-communication attitude can be explained satisfactorily solely in
terms of the volume of spontaneous counterargument. The relationship
between counterargument and acceptance should, of course, be inverse.
As can be seen from Table , level of counterargument did indeed relate
quite strongly to yielding. The within-class coefficient of determination
indicates that approximately 32% of the variance in attitude data can
be accounted for by that variable's linear relationship to counterargument.
Of even greater interest is the cell by cell analysis, which indicates
that as much as SA/t of the variance in Attitude is attributed to counter-
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argument variation (Audio Mode, High Decision Involvement). In fact,
the strength of the relationship is contingent to some degree on the mode
in which the advertisement was presented. Counterargument proved to be
a significantly stronger mediator of yielding among subjects receiving
the Audio Mode message than among those receiving the Print version
(Z = 2.10, p < .04).
As can be seen, the strength of the relationship is slightly
(non-signif icantly) attenuated when Attitudep is the criterion and
even more so when the delayed buying intentions measure is the
criterion. This decrease in the importance of counterargument as
a mediator is logical given the theoretical differences between the
three criterions. Cognitions evoked in response to message arguments
would be most salient to Attitude^-., a measure tied to modification
along the product dimensions explicitly deals with by the communication;
somewhat less salient in evaluation of the total product (Ap) ; and even
less prominent (among other possible considerations) in determining
overt behavioral intentions. This pattern might be expected to hold
(and does) throughout the analysis--the more removed the acceptance measure
is from that topic defined by message arguments, the less direct the
mediating role of message-oriented cues. Note, however, that level of
counterargument still accounts for over 207o of the variance in the delayed
measure of intentions.
The Unweighted Compensatory Model
This model derives from the assumption that the individual may
process the cognitive cues in such a manner that opposing cues linearly
balance each other. The index from such a model provides a measure of
the net directional impact of the designated cues. Model A limits the
admissable cues to message-oriented responses; thus, the difference
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between level of support argument and level of counterargument is the
predictor. This compensatory model proved to be only slightly more
efficient in explaining attitudinal variation than the counterargument
model. Formal consideration of support arguments led to a substantial
increase in prediction only under limited conditions. Among the Print
Mode, High Decision Involvement group, the increase in fraction of
variance in Attitudep explained approached significance (t = 1.72,
P < .10).
While retaining the assumption of equal weighting, the compensatory
model may be extended to include the final class of cues, source deroga-
tions. The addition of source derogations within the mediational model
adds significant explanatory power (relative to the counterargument
model) but again the new set of cues appear to operate only under certain
conditions
.
The within-class correlation coefficient obtained for Model B is
significantly higher than that for the counterargument model only when
Ac is the criterion ( t = 1.97, p < .05). Additionally, on a within-
cell basis, the improvement is significant only within the Print Mode,
High Decision Involvement group, and here the difference relative to
the counterargument model is significant for both Ac and Ap (t = 2.09,
p < .05, and t = 3.07, p < .01, respectively).
In sumiTiary, models making an assumption that receivers utilize all
the cognitive response cues generated appear preferable to the counter-
argument-only model only under certain exposure conditions (when an
acutely attentive receiver is exposed to a commercial message in
print)
. Counterarguments emerge as the most important cue by far in
the other advertising environments represented in this study.
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Differential Weighting Models
The weighting dimension is the evaluative i.mportance an individual
assigns to an individual cognitive response in shaping attitude toward
the synthetic food product. The weights were assigned post-hoc; and
a linear weighting convention was used ("very important" cognitions
assigned a weight of 3; "moderately important" a weight of 2; "slightly
important" a weight of 1). The assumption of unequal weighting appears
to improve the cognitive response model's explanation of the attitudinal
data. Inclusion of the weighting term significantly strengthens the
response model's within-class correlation with Attitude^
,
relative to
the counterargument model (t = 1.78, p < .07) and to the unweighted
compensatory model (Model A) (t = .229, p < .01), This significant
increase is similarly found in predicting Attitude^ (p < .01 in both
comparisons). Overall, Model C adds approximately .04 to the fraction
of variance explained by Model A, and approximately .08 to the fraction
of variance explained by the counterargument model. This increment
appears to have occurred most dramatically within the Low Decision
Involvement treatment. While the differential weighting factor had
negligible effect when involvement was high, the effect was reasonably
strong when involvement was lower. It ?dds between .07 and .10 to the
explained variance in each of the attitude measures.
Since a controversy has arisen about the value of the weighting
term in linear models of structure, weighting within the process of
attitude change is of interest. It is clear that in this study,
individual women did attach different degrees of importance to various
cognitions which they experienced during exposure, and that these
weights adjusted the role of the cognitive cue in mediating post-
communication attitude. This happened only where subjects were not
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highly involved in evaluating the advertising information.
An explanation may lie in the variability of importance ratings
across experimental treatments. Given the motivational impetus of
high processing involvement, subjects may have concentrated on highly
important associations. This would limit the activation of unimportant
cues. The more homogeneous the importance weightings, the less the
improvement in variance explanation relative to an unweighted model.
In support of this proposal, the correlation between weighted and un-
weighted models is .975 in the High Decision Involvement treatment and
.947 in the Low Decision Involvement treatment (Z = 1.93, p < .06).
Multiple Regression Analysis
The analysis presented so far has taken the form of testing different
a priori theoretical assumptions about the role of cognitive responses
in mediating the yielding process. This approach enabled the highlighting
and comparison of rational models. To provide supplementary insight,
multiple regression analyses were performed on the data. Table 2 gives
the results of a stepwise multiple regression using all three cognitive
response variables plus the two reception measures as regressors. The
analysis presented is one in which all candidate variables were forced
into the regression equation. The multivariate analysis, as expected,
clearly complements the evidence obtained from the testing of the theo-
retically-derived models. For the pooled sample, counterargument is by
far the best predictor of communication acceptance. Counterargument
and support argument form the best two-variable set, and source deroga-
tion is added to form the best three-variable set. Reception of cues
contained within the advertising message was not related to attitudinal
acceptance
.
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This analysis clearly demonstrates that as the measure of attitudinal
effect becomes more divorced from the actual advertising message, counter-
argument engaged in spontaneously during exposure remains strongly re-
lated to attitudinal position. This is in marked contrast to the steadily
weakening importance of the other two types of cognitive responses. Thus,
when Attitude^ is the criterion, all three variables appear to be impor-
tant; when Attitudep is the criterion, the weighting of source derogation
is substantially decreased; and when Buying Intentions is the criterion,
only counterargument and support argument are weighted significantly,
with the latter of relatively less importance.
Multivariate analysis performed on a within-cell basis likewise
supports the preceding findings. If we use beta-coefficients as indicants
of relative importance, the three cognitive response variables contribute
almost equally as mediators in the Print Mode, High Decision Involvement
cell, while counterargument dominates the other conditions. Multiple
correlation coefficients range between .51 and .78 across cells.
Independent Validation of the Relative Importance of the Variables
If, as the preceding nnalysis suggests, counterarguments are
weighted heavier than support arguments, which in turn are more im-
portant than source derogations, the post-hoc assignment of importance
ratings by the subjects should reflect this. The subjects rated each
separate thought in ignorance of any possible coding procedure. These
ratings, when aggregated within the cognitive response categories as
independently coded by the judges, do indeed reflect an identical pattern
of importance. The mean importance rating for counterarguments was 1.41,
for support arguments 1.71, and for source derogations 2.02 (1 = very
important) . Source derogations were rated by the women as significantly
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less in^ortant to them than either counterarguments (p < .001) or
support arguments ( ? < .001). Support arguments were rated as sig-
nificantly less important than counterarguments (p < .001). The
evidence about variable weighting found in the natural relationships of
the coded protocol data and that from subjects' own perceptions of un-
coded protocols must be viewed as convincingly validating each other.
Perceived Origin of the Cognitive Cues
The premise that cognitive cues supplied by the receiver are the
primary mediator in the advertising influence process forms the founda-
tion for this attempt to define, measure, and explain that process. The
preceding comparison of response vs. retention measures supports this
assumption, Greenwald (8) proposed a slightly different technique for
testing the premise in which subjects are allowed to indicate the origin
of each of their cognitions. Such a measure was taken in this study.
The protocol cognitions were then regrouped according to this perceived
origin system. This breakdown classified i6.77» of the thoughts as
advertisement-originated, 47.47<, as recipient -modified, and 35.9%
as recipient-generateo. Cues entailing some receiver input far out-
numbered those provided by the laessage.
These perceived-origin variables were entered as regressors into
a stepwise multiple regression analysis. Separate analyses were per-
formed for each attitudinal criterion. The analysis, adjusted for treat-
ment effects, is presented in Table 3. All three types of cues contribute
significantly to the prediction of the Attitude 3; however, with the more
global measures, only recipient-modified and recipient-generated cues
appear important. Since there is little discrepancy among the beta
coefficients, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the
relative importance of these latter classes.
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Discussion
A major finding of the study was that the attitudinal acceptance
of a persuasive marketing communication may be modeled quite well in
terms of an array of cognitive responses. The cognitive response vari-
ables defined for this study appear to be valid representations of the
cognitive cues utilized, and the array is successfully represented in
terms of these categories. A receiver relies heavily on her evaluative
mental responses to message content, rather than on the content itself,
to arrive at an attitudinal position after exposure.
Negative cognitions were found to be utilized more directly in
mediating attitude than were positive cognitions. In general, negative
cognitions oriented toward the specific information presented by the
advertisement (counterarguments) were the most important cues in the
receiver's information processing strategy. Support arguments and
source derogations were admitted as reliable cues within the decision
process only when situational variables permitted extensive processing.
Receivers of mass-media advertising messages appear to adopt an
essentially defensive information processing strategy. The extremely
limited and discrete exposure intervals which characterize mass-media
advertising and the undisguised persuasive nature of the messages may
be factors contributing to this strategy. The receiver is characterized
as attempting to efficiently cope with the barrage of information arriving
from the media. The receiver may handle this complex task by (a) not
engaging his cognitive processes in certain cases (inattention), or
(b) by attempting to utilize the cues generated by his cognitive proces-
ses (in cases where these processes are engaged) so as to decrease the
risks of error in modification of his existing cognitive structure.
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A counterargument is a recognized discrepancy between an entering
piece of information and existing elements. No counterargument can
occur as a cue unless the incoraing information has actually been com-
pared to what is already known- Support arguments can also occur fol-
lowing such a comparison process. This is not necessarily the case,
however. The receiver may be aware of support arguments among his thoughts
(i.e., those he just took in from the message), even if the comparison
process had broken down momentarily. Thus, if receivers do rely on
this cognitive comparison process to evaluate new information, counter-
arguments would represent a more dependable cue than support arguments.
When the communication environment facilitates the cognitive com-
parison process, the receiver can be more certain that the support
argument has actually evolved from the comparison process. Thus, the
risk in admitting support arguments as influences on attitude modification
are decreased. Two environmental factors related to the efficient oper-
ation of the cognitive comparison process would be time available (the
receiver's capacity) and intensity of the cognitive activity (the
receiver's arousal). The finding throughout the analyses that support
arguments were weighted heavily only in the experimental cell which
maximized both of the above factors supports this discussion.
The strategies of consumers in processing information from adverti-
sing were shown to be situationally adaptive. Differences in modality
and in involvement had an influence on the cues used and their relative
importance. The effects of other variables which might influence the
receiver's capacity for response or motivation to respond should be
studied; certain general strategies of information processing across
situations defined in terras of capacity and motivation will hopefully
be observed.
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The influence of message modality on the process of attitude
modification has been generally ignored by social psychologists and
advertising researchers. Media comparisons remain confined to the
probability of eliciting attention (and since these use circulation,
readership, and listenership data, the "attention" they indicate is
behaviorally suspect). The results here suggest that basic researchers,
especially those with an "information processing" perspective on per-
suasive communication, should begin to find message modality a much
more interesting variable in the future.
The importance of source-oriented responses declined substantially
as the attitude measure became more removed from the message itself.
This pattern is logical, since the value of source rejections as dis-
counting factors should apply only to the specific content of that
one message. Changes in the relevance of the different types of
cognitive responses across attitude measures was pronounced, and
illustrates the desirability of carefully considering the specific
attitude object to which a measure refers in analyzing the role of
various mediators.
The differential weighting of cognitive responses according to
category which is evident in much of the data analysis must be con-
sidered as a process separate from the differential weighting of indi-
vidual cognitions as implied by the Weighted Integrative Model. In
this model, the weights entered were those assigned to the individual
thoughts, not the categories. Although this assignment reflected the
category weighting to a large degree, it can also be concluded that
individual weighting within categories took place. Consideration of
this type of cue weighting improved the model, although the improvement
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was moderate.
It may be instructive to attempt to reconcile these findings within
the framework of previous information processing theory. Newell, Shaw
and Simon (1958) suggest that the components of an information processing
strategy consist of an array of cues (in this case, the spontaneous
cognitive responses) and a discrimination net, which represents rules
for combining (weighting) the cues. The array may be depicted as below.
W__CA WggSA WgjSD
ca
W^Q Advertising origin Wj^Cj^..w^c^ w^c w^c
"I'^l'-'^k^k
^RM Recipient modified w^^c^^. .w-jC^ w-, c-, . .w c^j^ w-|Cj^..w c
Wr>g Recipient generated w^c-|..w^Cjj w^c-]..w c w^c-j-.w^c^
where CA = counterargument
SA = support argument
SD = source derogation
The column weights would be a function of the cognitive decision
strategy chosen by the receiver on the basis of situational constraints.
The weights cannot be considered as constants, although this study
warrants the conclusion that W may tend to be relatively higher than
Wgg or Wgj in many communication settings. Similarly, the data suggest
that among the row weights, W^q will be relatively less than W or Wg^g.
The cognition weights (wj^) would be a function of the content of the
cognition, and would probably be related to the particular product
dimension on which the cognition focuses. The only conclusion reached
here is that there is evidence that these weights should be included
in the array.
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The findings of shifts in the importance of different types of
cognitive mediators as a function of situational variations provides
considerable insight into why contemporary research in attitude change is
characterized by conflicting results. In a typical persuasion study, when
predictions about the effectol an independent variable on beliefs or affect are
made frequently only a single mediating process is considered. If the possibility
of multiple mediators does occur, the researcher makes an assumption, with no at-
tempt to substantiate about the relative importance of the mediating cues and pro-
ceeds from there. Rarely do hypotheses arise which entertain an idea of inter-
action among the cues. Yet the current results suggest strongly that,
for example, a prediction based on the counterargument mediator would
have a good chance of success in an audio transmission to an attentive
audience, but would be much less accurate in a print transmission to
the same audience. Similarly, a prediction based on both counterarguments,
source reactions, and support arguments might not be very accurate with
an audio transmission to either an involved or uninvolved audience. The
point is that we are still quite naive in our ability to analyze a persua-
sion situation in terms of the mediating cues which will be operative there. Hope-
fully research building on the initial evidence and approach demonstrated
in this study will begin to improve tnis position.
The use of spontaneous free-response recording of thought processes
appears to be an extremely promising method for studying communication
effects. Coding of such responses by judges was seen to be a reliable
undertaking if the judges work from a framework of rigorously defined
variables. Such measures offer important advantages over researcher-
imposed measures. The information contained in such protocols is
extremely rich compared to sterile, frequently uninvolving measures
requiring nothing more than a quick checkmark on the part of the
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subject. The set of variables defined here appear to offer a valid
representation of certain types of cognitive behavior which may be
meaningful to advertising response. Testing of these variables,
measured in accordance with the methodology introduced, is recommended.
Of course, future research may also wish to take the perspective that
this set of cognitive response variables should be elaborated. Different
assumptions may be made about the optimal number, content, or dimension-
ality of the variables recaptured from protocols. Such assumptions are
subject to empirical testing. Advertising "verbatims" are frequently
gathered from post-exposure interviews to serve a diagnostic function.
Analysis of these rich protocols has not typically been systematic,
nor has the method of gathering this data been tightly controlled.
Application of the methodology and framework developed here in pre-
testing message effects would seem promising.
The use of multivariate analysis in experimental studies of com-
munication effects has been rare; in fact, a review of basic and applied
literature failed to uncover a single instance. Tests of hierarchical
models of consumer decision making have appeared ( ), but these have
been concerned with more "macro" processes. This study demonstrated
two analytic approaches for studying the micro-processes leading to
attitude change: testing of theoretically rational aggregative models
using bivariate analysis and more exploratory disaggregative multiple
regression. Since multiple variables as mediators of attitude change
are indicated, the use of these two complementary approaches, in con-
junction with the direct process methodology, should find increased use
in future research.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTERARGUMENTS : Statements which are directed against the idea of or
the use of the products in the advertising communication and which:
(a) state a specific unfavorable consequence of using the product
(b) state a specific undesirable attribute of the product
(c) suggest an alternative method for handling one of the problems
cited in the advertising message
(d) state a specific favorable or desirable consequence or attribute
of an alternative product
(e) challenge the accuracy or validity of a specific argument con-
tained in the advertising message
These statements may take the form of declarative sentences or rhetorical
questions . If the statement is in the form of a rhetorical question,
its intent should be argumentative or express doubt or disbelief.
The following types of statements are not to be considered as COUNTER-
ARGUMENTS .
(a) simple statements of dislike for the product idea
(b) emotional reactions which aren't accompanied by any of the types
of statements discussed above
(c) statements falling into any of the other categories (source deroga-
tions - supporting arguments - expressions of curiosity)
SOURCE DEROGATIONS
(a) Statements expressing distrust or derogation of advertisements or
the advertisers.
(b) Statements expressing dislike for the overall means used by the
advertiser in this presentation.
SUPPORT ARGUMENTS : statements which are directed in favor of the idea
or use of the product in the advertising message and which:
(a) state a specific favorable consequence of using the product or a
favorable reason for using the product
(b) state a specific desirable attribute of the product
(c) suggest an undesirable consequence of not using synthetic meals
products

(d) reaffirm the accuracy or validity of an argument presented in the
advertisement
The following types of statements are not to be considered as SUPPORT
ARGUMENTS.
(a) simple statements of liking for the product
(b) positive emotional reactions unaccompanied by any of the types of
statements
CURIOSITY
Statements expressing interest in additional information about the
product. These curiosity expressions are distinguishable from rhetorical-
question COUNTERARGUMENTS by your judgment on the subject's intent. If
the intent was to question validity, express disbelief, or point out
a counterargument, the statement is a COUNTERARGUMENT. If the intent
is to honestly inquire about more information, it is a CURIOSITY statement,
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